This article examines the violence surrounding a war that the Danish East India Company declared against the Mughal Empire during the mid-seventeenth century. To explain why such a small chartered company would declare war against such a formidable foe, the relationship between trade, violence and statecraft in both societies is discussed at length. The article further describes how the war was waged, including the complex legal situation surrounding it and the various ways in which the opponents tried to hold each other responsible for losses. Using the Danish-Mughal war as a vehicle for exploring relations between European and Asian merchants, the article argues that violence was the contingency plan of even the weakest European companies.
Introduction
Halfway through the seventeenth century, when various European companies had already made their presence felt in Asia but colonial rule was still on a distant horizon, the Danish East India Company declared war against the Mughal Empire. Such a small and inconsistently supported trading company was no defend these privileges. Such authorizations within the legal system of the seafarers' country of domicile permitted the development of considerable expertise in seaborne violence.7
Violence and commerce were intertwined in other ways as well. Mercantilism, the dominant economic theory in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe, associated states' strength with their economic dominance. It also emphasized commercial competition. Such competition stemmed in part from the persistent notion of finite wealth, a corollary of the belief that the wealth of one nation must be obtained at the expense of another. Consequently mercantilists sought to strengthen their own state and its economy and to weaken those of foreign adversaries. The pursuit of military strength was closely intertwined because it was believed that strength was needed to protect and augment wealth while wealth was needed to generate and support strength. Thus across Europe, rulers sought to consolidate their states' power through the twin goals of increasing national wealth and expanding the military.
Known as "the first princely Mercantilist,"8 King Christian IV (1588-1648) sought to increase Denmark's sphere of influence and its financial and economic independence.9 The navy was important to his plans because it facilitated the administration of Denmark's territories and the enforcement of the Sound Tolls, a fee charged for the passage merchant vessels from Western Europe into the Baltic. The Sound Tolls constituted an important source of income for the Danish kings who used it to further enhance the navy and finance other state projects. Christian IV undertook a wide variety of initiatives but was repeatedly thwarted by political and economic conditions. The early seventeenth-century Danish economy was based on cattle and grains, with a large percentage of the population directly engaged in agriculture. Thus when Christian IV encouraged the manufacture of glue, paper, and other goods in an attempt to spare the cost of expensive imports, the Danish market could not assimilate these products.10 Nevertheless he stimulated the establishment of trading companies for Greenland, Iceland, and the West and East Indies. It was hoped that these companies would encourage employment and trade, and they occupied a central position in the government's plans for economic development.11 Their charters granted these companies the right to use violence in order to defend their trading privileges in other regions.
Maritime Trade, State Participation and Violence in Asia
Increased interest in trade during the early modern era was not an exclusively European phenomenon. There was also an expansion of Asian commerce during the fifteenth through mid -eighteenth centuries. This was characterized by a quantitative increase in international trade, a rise in trade between northern and southern regions, as well as openness, competition, and refined financial and commercial techniques. There emerged numerous port-centered states such as Aden and Melaka, while various larger states, such as Iran, Golconda, and the Mughal state, assumed a semi-agrarian, semi-commercial political character.12 Despite the wide spread of this increased interest, Asian attitudes towards maritime commerce varied greatly.
The Mughals are the classic example of a continental Asian empire with an aloof attitude towards maritime commerce. While there was an avid desire to accrue wealth, the majority of their income came from land-based sources. 13 The imperial government was concerned with port revenues, the import of bullion, and the safety of pilgrims to Mecca, but by and large it left seaborne commerce to various groups of merchants.14 During the formative years of the empire, they assumed a laissez-faire policy that allowed merchants to develop sophisticated commercial techniques independent of the state. Influenced by Iranian ideas regarding the combination of imârat (administration) and tijârat (commerce),15 the nobility took a greater interest in commerce during the seventeenth century. 16 During the reign of Emperor Shah Jahan (1628-1658) there was even a military campaign to improve imperial control over commerce in Bengal.17 However, the Mughal government per se did not have its own trade. 18 Other Asian powers were more deeply interested and involved in maritime affairs. Prior to a shogunal decree in 1635, Japan actively pursued overseas expansion, as exemplified by its invasion of Korea during the 1590s and by its issuing of certificates conferring protection to its people trading overseas. 19 In Southeast Asia, most states pursued trade and ambitious rulers sought to exploit trade for the development of their realms and personal enrichment. Among them were the rulers of Gowa and Tallo who deliberately encouraged commerce and succeeded in transforming Makassar from a small port into a thriving, cosmopolitan emporium.20 In South Asia, various Malabari rulers sustained a keen interest in international commerce. The rulers of Calicut, for example, actively fostered the pepper trade and facilitated it by protecting and enforcing property rights.21 In some instances Asian rulers also employed sailors specialized in violence to enforce their commercial policies. In the Malay world the sultan of the famed port state Melaka attempted to hire Chinese vessels to fight against his rivals; and Johor's rulers employed seafarers known as orang laut in their navy for both defensive functions, such as guarding sea lanes, and offensive purposes, including raiding passing ships. Merchant vessels in the maritory of Barkur on the Malabar coast were required to make a gift to the ruler. If they failed to do so, the ruler's fleet would pursue them and force them to pay double.22 In such instances Asian rulers were essentially extending their control of trade into the sea surrounding the port by employing naval forces and legitimizing their use of violence. Thus European rulers were not alone in their engagement of entrepreneurs who specialized in violence to enforce their commercial policies.
The Establishment of the Danish East India Company and Its Declaration of War against the Mughal Empire
The Danish East India Company was chartered in 1616 with the strong and sustained support of Christian IV. He exerted considerable pressure in order to raise the company's initial stock capital of 180,000 rix-dollars, contributing 17,000 rix-dollars of it himself. While 180,000 rix-dollars was a significant amount in seventeenth-century Denmark, it was just 1/14th of the starting capital of the United (Dutch) East India Company (VOC);23 thus from its start, Additionally, a manifesto justifying his position was written in Portuguese for the information of "all the Christian nations in these parts of Oriental India" and "the most important people and lords of all parts of India."41 Dated August 24, 1644, the five-page document enumerates the offenses that the Danes wanted to redress. It begins during the reign of Jahangir with the loss of Jupiter in 1625, including its valuable Makassarese cargo, and the imprisonment of its captain and crew. It also describes the kidnapping of a Danish boy who was forced to become a Muslim and was never seen again. It then recounts the foundering of Nattergalen in 1626 and the subsequent forced transport of the captain and crew to Cuttack where they were ransomed. The document blames the Mughal governor for both of these instances as well as for obstructing their potentially profitable voyage to Makassar. It then describes how the Danes stopped trading in Bengal because of these "robberies, offenses and tyrannies" and the impossibility of obtaining compensation but later reversed this decision at the request of "Moors from Bengal" who promised to treat them fairly. It also depicts other offenses during the reign of Shah Jahan. These include the Mughal governor's obstruction of commerce, the assault on Danish factors at Pipli, and the poisoning of shipwrecked Danish servants. Recounted with expressive detail about how the poison ravaged the victims' livers to pieces, the tale of poisoning has been doubted by scholars.42 It is not, however, the most colorful episode in the manifesto. There is also a rather unlikely account of how a Mughal official not only refused to allow people to assist a Danish ship in distress but also pitched a tent on the shore from which to watch it founder. Furthermore, according to the document, the Mughals' injustices drove the Danish company's commander Pessart to such a state of despondency "that he took refuge in an unknown place where he remains until now."43 The manifesto 41 "Manifesta justificaçao," ff. 
At Sea versus on Land
To the Danish company's servants in Asia, the formal manifesto and its distribution lent legitimacy to their predation. The Danish agents believed that they were fighting a justified war and that the uncompromising Muslims of Bengal were "responsible for all deaths, destructions, losses and damages that they shall suffer."45 Despite their outrage, it is clear that the Danish company servants were very much concerned with financial gain. Insufficiently supported by the motherland, the Danes used the war to finance their presence in Asia. This source of revenue was especially important during the twenty-nine years from 1639 until 1668 during which the company was dissolved and resurrected, and no reinforcements were sent from Denmark to Asia. Intended to satisfy numerous audiences, this manifest exemplifies the manner in which European company servants tried to justify the use of force. In Europe during the seventeenth century there raged a debate among scholars and jurists as to the legality and morality of maritime violence. Among company servants in Asia, however, pragmatic concerns often overrode the principles of natural law and freedom of the seas deliberated in Europe, and company agents wrote complicated, and sometime convoluted, arguments to justify their use of violence. Often they compiled long lists of grievances, made assumptions about who was responsible for losses incurred, and supplemented these with accounts of unsuccessful attempts at obtaining compensation. Typically they presented the use of violence as the last resort. The Danes' focus on private ships in the Bay of Bengal as opposed to the main Mughal port of Surat suggests that they were more interested in making money quickly than attacking the Mughals. Their desire for financial gain is also clearly apparent in numerous sets of instructions ordering the arrest of as many Bengali ships as possible and the seizure of cargoes as prizes of war. Instructions specify that special attention should be paid to Bengali ships coming from Jaffapatnam or Ceylon that may carry pearls or money, and from Pegu that might carry rubies or other gemstones. Further orders give specific instructions for seizing ships with elephants which were to be delivered to the ruler of Arakan. This is in accordance with the Danish desire to arrange for free trade at Arakan and, if possible, for an alliance with Arakan against the Bengalis. Instructions also order the seizure of any objects on board which could be useful, such as anchors or tools, or anything which could be sold for a profit.47 Special effort to capture ships returning from Southeast Asia was also prescribed because their cargoes were particularly valuable.48 Instructions also specify how to make a profit from captured people and ships. Captives could be baptized and sold as slaves or put to work for the company as sailors or carpenters, and the vessels could be used for intra-Asian trade.49 Especially when the Danish company's ships fell into such disrepair that they had to be scrapped for firewood,50 new vessels became essential.
The most information available about the prizes seized by the Danes dates from the 1640s. Examples include the Christianshavn's seizure of a Bengali ship near Nakapur in December 1643. The captured ship was 250 lasts, a year and a half old, and contained a cargo of iron.51 The following year, the Danes captured a small ship coming from Pipli containing twenty-one packages of pepper and nineteen slaves, a much larger ship coming from the Maldives with valuable cowries, and a Bengali ship returning from Southeast Asia with four valuable Acehnese elephants.52 These elephants were given to the King of Golconda, and the ship was incorporated into the Danish fleet. The calculative, businesslike manner in which Danish company archives record these seizures obscures the human suffering involved. Only slightly more revealing is Leyel's letter to the company's managing shareholders in which he reported that they were doing their best to cause the Bengalis as much harm as possible.53 Without a doubt the Danes gravely impacted the business and careers of individual merchants not to mention the lives of captives. As a result, traders in Bengal did not want to go to sea for fear of being captured by the Danes.54
Resistance against the Danes appears to have been ineffective and uncommon. Danish colonial historian Gunnar Olsen describes resignation on the part of the Bengalis, writing that "the Bengalis seem to have given up in advance on any form of resistance against the Danish ships."55 While this often may have been the case, there was resistance on some occasions. For example, in 1644 off the Gingeli coast the yacht Walby seized two large Bengali ships with elephants on board. Some of the elephants reportedly died in the skirmish,56 documenting the use of violence. People died, too. Indeed, the Makassarese ruler Sultan Hasanuddin (1653-1669) refused to admit the ships Fredericus and Morningstar, which the Danes had captured from Muslim traders, because they had killed the people on the ships.57 Clearly not all of the vessels that the Danes seized surrendered without protest.
The inefficacy of resistance stems from crucial differences between European and Mughal capabilities in sea-borne warfare.58 Mughals ships were 52 not always unarmed but there appears to have been differences between the quality of Asian and European weapons and the sailors' levels of experience in handling them.59 Arguably Asian cannons and gunpowder were inferior to their European counterparts, and when European-made weapons were obtainable, Asians often used them awkwardly. Seventeenth-century Dutch sources record the opinion that guns on Asian vessels were ineffective because they were mounted in the wrong place and the Asians did not know how to use them.60 Writing in the eighteenth century, Robert Orme also noted that Indians had "no conception that it was possible to fire, with execution, the same piece of cannon five or six times in a minute; for in the awkward management of their own clumsy artillery, they think they do well if they fire once in a quarter of an hour."61 Thus Europeans, including the comparatively poorly equipped Danes, often had a technical advantage over Asians, including the potent Mughals, in warfare at sea. This difference, however, was not so large that it could not be surmounted when Asian states adopted a policy of using maritime violence for commercial and political purposes.62 With warfare on land, the balance of power was completely opposite. It appears, however, that there were only two isolated instances of conflicts between the Danes and the Mughals on land. The first was during the early 1640s before the war was declared. The Danes stationed at Pipli under Poul Nielsen had tremendous financial difficulties. One Persian merchant in particular owed the Danes a considerable amount of money and refused to pay his debts despite repeated requests. The Danes then decided to take justice into 59 A. Jan Qaisar notes that Indian ships were equipped with artillery as early as the 1610s.
( their own hands and imprisoned him within his own home. When this failed, they seized one of his slaves and impounded some of his goods at the Danish trading post. Presumably viewing this as a breach of sovereignty, the Mughals were unwilling to accept such behavior. They sent a force of three hundred men to seize and burn the Danish trading station. All of the goods were confiscated and the factors were imprisoned, although Nielsen and others eventually escaped to Tranquebar.63 A second instance occurred during the mid-1640s after the war had already begun. A ship with a crew of six Danes was wrecked off the coast of Bengal. The crew reached the shore safely only to realize that they were in enemy territory. They hid in the forest until after dark when they headed towards the river mouth near Pipli. Upon arrival they sighted a Dutch ship anchored in the river and risked being detected by the locals to signal it. The Dutch sent a boat to pick up the castaways and promised to take them to the Christianshavn which was anchored nearby. In the event, however, the Bengalis learned who the castaways were and demanded their surrender. Wanting to maintain good trading relations in Bengal, the Dutch acquiesced and the Bengalis imprisoned the castaways. Coincidentally the Danes on board Christianshavn sent a boat ashore that very evening for fresh water and provisions. When they stopped to chat with people on board the Dutch ship, they learned the fate of the Danish castaways and decided to launch a rescue mission that night. Nielsen led a team of sixteen men, and his familiarity with Pipli enabled him to proceed directly to the governor's house where the castaways were reportedly being held. They attacked the guards, drove the governor away, and searched the house but could not find their comrades. Nielsen then suggested searching the town hall, part of which was sometimes also used as a prison. The town hall was guarded by a party of soldiers who had heard the commotion and stood alert with unsheathed daggers. The Danes overpowered several of the guards at which point the others fled, and the Danes broke into the town hall. Inside they found the castaways in heavy iron chains. While it was impossible for the chained men to run and difficult to transport them back to the Christianshavn, they eventually succeeded with few casualties and no fatalities.64
In both cases, the Mughals could have easily used much larger forces. They certainly had the resources at their disposal, but there was no call for an exceptional display of force in the first instance. Three hundred men were more than sufficient to accomplish the task of burning the Danish trading station down and seizing the men and goods. A larger or better-armed contingent of guards would have prevented the Danes from freeing their comrades in the second instance. Presumably such a contingent was not used because the need was not anticipated. The Danes caught them by surprise and succeeded for this reason alone. By all measures the Mughals were a force to be reckoned with on land; their weakness was only at sea.
The Limits of Negotiation
Given their limits in naval power, the Mughals sought other means of putting an end to Danish aggression. Within just a few years of the start of the war, they made numerous attempts at concluding peace. In 1645 they made a peace offer which included 80,000 rupees in compensation but, hoping to receive 436,500 rix-dollars or to force himself into a profitable Bengali trade, Leyel declined and intensified the fighting instead. By 1647, the Danes had five ships in the sea fighting against Bengal. The adversary once again sought to compromise with the Danes in 1647 or early 1648,65 but negotiations did not result in a lasting peace. Danish instructions from 1647 only allowed for the conclusion of peace with the Bengalis on the condition that they make a large cash payment, that they grant the Danes the same trading privileges as the Dutch, and that they arrange for the pardon of all of the debts which Pessart accrued in Masulipatnam.
Their attempts at direct negotiation with the Danes having failed, the Mughals tried to exert pressure on other Europeans to stop Danish aggression. When the Danes seized two large ships, one of which carried goods worth 50,000 pieces of eight belonging to the Emperor Shah Jahan, Prince Shah Shuja (the second son of Shah Jahan), and Mirza Malik Beg (the governor of Pipli), and burned two other ships near Orissa, the Mughals were enraged.66 They could not, however, seek redress by using their military might because the Danes no longer had any settlements in Mughal territory.67 Therefore, the Prince Shah Shuja threatened the Dutch that they must put a stop to Danish aggression or leave Bengal, but he was eventually talked out of the ultimatum. of their merchants from the Danes. Although the Dutch found this proposal absurd and refused,69 the 'Gentlemen XVII' (Heeren XVII) who governed the VOC eventually condoned the protection of Muslim merchants who traded in Ceylon against the hostilities of the Danes.70 The Mughals also tried to work through the English. When the Danes seized eight valuable elephants in 1647, it was declared that "as the Danes and the English were alike Christians, any damage done by the former would have to be satisfied by the latter."71 The Mughals may have become more assertive in this policy by the end of the seventeenth century. In 1691 the Danes seized a ship belonging to the influential merchant Abd al-Ghafur. As a result, the local government at Surat confined all of the Europeans in that city, blocked their trade, and demanded restitution.72 Upon learning that the Danes were in fact responsible, Abd al-Ghafur argued convincingly that the English should be held responsible anyway because most pirates were English. 73 Peace negotiations were also complicated by a sense of loyalty felt by some of the Danish Company servants. As previously mentioned, Christian IV's relationship with the Danish East India Company was very close; indeed he had become "Head and Lord of the whole Company" in 1629.74 He had also steadfastly refused to liquidate the Company, despite its unprofitability, for fear of losing prestige in Denmark and abroad.75 After his death in 1648, however, the first Company was dissolved in 1650. While the isolated Danish factors in Asia were aware of its demise, they were obliged to maintain the settlements in Asia because they were owned by the Crown.76 Thus they carried on to the best of their abilities, using the prizes seized from the Bengalis as one of their main sources of income. When the Dutch tried to convince the Danes to stop the war because it was causing problems for their trade with Bengal, the governor In time, however, the Danes came to miss the Bengali market, and they renewed negotiations. The Danes' request for 400,000 rix-dollars in reparations was countered with a request for compensation for the more than thirty ships Yet this peace did not last. In so far as the Danes were plundering individual Bengali merchants for financial gain under the pretext of redressing the wrongs of Mughal officials in Bengal, things continued as usual. In 1682, the Christianshavn wrecked near Balasore, and the local faujdar (commander responsible for administering sub-districts) was blamed for its loss because he hindered the Danes' attempt to get help.84 As a result, hostilities were renewed against Bengal. 85 The governor of Tranquebar Wulff Henrich von Calnein (1686-1687) believed that the Danes were entitled to compensation for their losses and opted to press the issue. During his administration, the Danes captured four large Bengali ships and at least as many small cargo boats. 86 The Danes also terrorized peaceful merchants. The archives of the VOC provide details of one merchant's encounter with the Danes during this period of renewed hostility. A report made by Nakhoda Qamar in 1685 describes how he was unable to complete his voyage because of Danish harassment. He had obtained passes for his ship, but rumor had it that a Danish captain was going to attack him. A Danish captain did indeed board Nakhoda Qamar's ship and Nakhoda Qamar paid him 200 Spanish reals and 60 reals worth of cloth in an attempt to get him to leave peacefully. The Dane then seized the anchor keys and kept them overnight. The next day, he returned the anchor keys and the two parted company, firing a salute. This was not, however, the end of the encounter. Subsequently Nakhoda Qamar was followed by the aforementioned Danish ship for two days. On the third day a Malay ship going to Aceh with the permission of the Danes followed him shooting twice. The Danes then attacked Nakhoda Qamar's ship and seized various goods. They continued to follow him but they did not take anything more.87
During the closing years of the seventeenth century, when the Danes wished to reestablish their presence in Bengal, they again tried to negotiate peace. Despite decades of aggression they were well received. In 1698, Andreas Andrae, accompanied by Thomas Schmertz, was sent to Bengal with ships, Indian servants, money, wares, and Danish people to settle and trade. He was able to conclude peace with the Bengali governor Mohammed Ajumadi, after which both sides renounced their demands for previously seized ships. The Danes also made a gift to the prince of 15,000 rupees and four cannons. 88 Furthermore, Andrae signed a lease to a piece of land at Gondalapara near French Chandernagore for 30,000 rupees to be paid over ten years. 89 This became Dannemarksnagore where the Danes established a factory which served as the basis for their presence in Bengal.90
Conclusion
The question of how and why western Europeans came to exert dominance, however tenuous, over large parts of the world is central to early modern world historiography. One of the most provocative explanations is the military revolution paradigm.91 This posits that Europeans held a small but crucial advantage in military technology over other Eurasians during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which helps to explain why it was difficult for seaborne Indian merchants to resist Danish attacks. More importantly, this paradigm has stimulated a tremendous body of new research. Some of this has shown that when Eurasian governments chose to adopt a strategy of using naval force for commercial ends, they could quickly appropriate the necessary technologies and strategies and succeed in defeating western Europeans in naval combat.92 Indeed, technological differences appear to have been Wellen Journal of early modern history 19 (2015) 439-461 more easily surmountable than the underlying differences in the relationships between governments, maritime violence, and commerce.
The differences between governments and their relationships to maritime commerce and violence is exceptionally well illustrated by the Danish East India Company's war against the Mughal Empire. The contrast between the opponents' size and power is striking. By all measures, Denmark was small and poor compared to the Mughal Empire. Yet the Danish government was willing to exercise state power to facilitate and protect seaborne commerce. Indeed King Christian IV offered the Danish East India Company unconditional support, refusing to liquidate it even in the face of considerable losses. Meanwhile the Mughals were not among the Eurasian powers that chose to adopt a strategy of using naval force for commercial ends. Their attitude towards maritime merchants was largely laissez-faire and their relationship to them was less direct than that of the Danish state to the Danish East India Company. Thus when Mughal governors attempted to negotiate with the Danes, they did not enjoy the sort of backing from the empire that might have been offered by a "precocious" western European state.93
Also striking is Danish fearlessness in declaring war against one of the world's mightiest realms. This exemplifies an arrogant naïveté that was common among Europeans in the sixteenth century. Danish ignorance about Asian realms was first apparent in their willingness to sign a treaty with the Emperor of Ceylon who did not exist.94 While this predated the company's In 1612 King Senevirat had concluded a treaty with the VOC which granted the Dutch permission to construct a fortress, the right of unrestricted commerce, and a monopoly on cinnamon, pearls, and precious stones in exchange for military assistance against the Portuguese. In 1615, however, when King Senevirat actually sent Boshouwer to Holland to obtain this long-promised help, the VOC was preoccupied with Java and the Moluccas, and the States-General with the Thirty Years War. Boschouwer's request for Dutch assistance was refused so he tried his luck in Copenhagen. The Danish East India Company's war against the Mughals also provides a poignant reminder of the normalcy of violence in early modern commerce. The Danes' lack of reverence for nationality and convention, as is exemplified by their indiscriminant seizure of goods and their intentional stealth, is surprising. The violence itself, however, was ordinary. While the historiographical tendency has been to circumscribe the use of violence in terms of a EuropeanAsian balance between relative strength and weakness at sea and on land, any such balance succeeded only in limiting, and not in preventing, violence.96 It was not only critical to European enterprises in Asia but also significant to the commercial enterprises of some Asian governments like Barkur and Johor. Indeed violence permeated the age.97 That the Danes dared to declare war on the Mughals exemplifies the inextricable link between violence and commerce in the seventeenth century European mind.98
